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I. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy scholars have long recognized and documented the 
shortcomings of the fair information practice principles (herein “FIPPs”) of 
“notice, choice and consent” approach to protect information privacy.  These 
shortcomings are even more pronounced in today’s political and social world 
for three reasons.  First, big data and its concomitant algorithmic power have 
radically changed the nature and effects of personal information processing, 
challenging FIPPs style regulation in fundamental ways.  Second, the broad 
recognition of the social importance of privacy, especially its importance to 
 
*  Priscilla M. Regan is a Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George 
Mason University.  Prior to that, she was a Senior Analyst at the Congressional Office of 
Technology Assessment.  1  Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Amsterdam 
Privacy Conference in October 2018 and the Privacy Law Scholars Conference in May 2019.  
The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments received at these conferences 
from Lisa Austin, Jacquelyn Burkell, Julie Cohen, Bob Gellman, Woody Hartzog, Sarah Igo, 
Cameron Kerry, Siona Listokin-Smith, Mary Madden, Bill McGeveran, Deirdre Mulligan, 
Kobbi Nissim, Jim Rule and Valerie Steeves.  The author also appreciates the research 
assistance of Caroline Ball, an MPA student at George Mason University. 
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democracy, undercuts the rationale for an individual rights approach and 
renders FIPPs even more problematic.  Third, the emergence of large internet 
platforms controlling how individuals experience social, political, and 
economic life has rendered a FIPPs approach to protecting privacy obsolete 
and ineffective.  Several scholars have examined the rationale for and 
potential effectiveness of policy alternatives to FIPPs, including alternatives 
such as an anti-trust approach or regulation modeled on environmental 
regulation.  In a 2017 essay in the Maryland Law Review, I provided a 
preliminary investigation of whether and how the public trustee concept 
might be applied to information privacy policy.  In that piece, as here, I was 
using the term “public trustee”2 in its broadest sense to represent a position 
of trust with a legal obligation to use its powers solely for the benefit of the 
public—in this case, that personal data would be used in a fair and 
responsible manner.  My thinking paralleled that of others arguing that an 
individual rights approach to privacy protection was ineffective and that 
instead, obligations should be placed on those organizations collecting and 
using data.  Neil Richards and Woody Hartzog emphasized the importance 
of “trust,”3 while Jack Balkin and Lindsey Barrett spoke of “information 
fiduciaries.”4  At the same time that scholars and policymakers are exploring 
policy alternatives to FIPPs, larger issues regarding the power of major 
internet actors (ISPs and platforms/edge players) and their lack of 
accountability to the public have surfaced.  Most recently, this has arisen in 
the context of “fake news,” the explosion of biased and inaccurate 
information on the internet and its effect on public discourse and democratic 
participation, as well as the implications of reversing net neutrality 
regulations. 
This tide of current events has brought attention to the fact that the 
fundamental policy problem regarding today’s major internet actors is 
“private power and American democracy.”5  During the transition from a 
largely agricultural based economy to an industrial based economy, a 
number of regulatory regimes, rationales and institutions (e.g., anti-trust, 
public utilities, common carriers, consumer protection) were developed to 
control the negative effects of the private power exercised by major 
 
 2   See generally Priscilla M. Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying 
it to Information Privacy Policy, 76 MARYLAND L. REV. 1025 (2017). 
 3   See generally Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy 
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L REV. 431–472 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s 
Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L. J. 1180 (2017). 
 4   See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185 (2016); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, 
the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE L. REV. 1057 (2019). 
 5   GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, New York: 
Knopf (1966). 
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economic actors of that time (e.g., railroads, communication companies).  To 
a large extent, and not surprisingly, current discussions about possible policy 
solutions to the problems posed by new actors wielding private power in 
democratic systems have tended to use the frameworks and ideas of earlier 
policy eras.  But, as has also been recognized in policy discussions regarding 
information privacy and organizational interests, pouring new wine into old 
bottles is not always effective.6  The limitations of the regulatory regimes of 
the industrial age to that of the information age are increasingly recognized 
and a range of scholars are exploring alternative regulatory schemes.7 
At this time, there are three primary arguments being offered in current 
policy discussions regarding the rationales to curb the private power wielded 
over internet-based activities: (1) the real or potential anti-competitive 
behavior of key internet gatekeepers; (2) the commodification of personal 
information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions; and (3) the explosion of fake 
news or inaccurate and biased information particularly on social media sites.  
The debate on the first is focused on the policy solution of net neutrality.  
The debate on the second in the U.S. has focused on rethinking a sectoral 
FIPPs approach as well as a self-regulatory approach.  Last, the debate on 
the third raises questions of censorship and First Amendment conflicts. 
In this paper, I focus on the synergy that exists among the three 
rationales being offered for regulating internet-based actors and on the 
underlying problem of private power on the internet, a power that is fueled 
by personal information.  I argue that if policymakers resolve the information 
privacy question effectively, that will, at a minimum, mitigate the problems 
of fake news and misinformation, which is highly dependent upon easy 
access to information about individuals’ consumer practices, activities, 
interests, philosophical leanings/orientations, etc., so that messages can be 
targeted to particular subgroups in the population.  If access to such data is 
removed, it becomes far more difficult to target messages.  At the same time 
if policymakers resolve the information privacy question, that will also 
reduce the control and discretion that major internet actors gain from the 
personal information they have access to and will decrease one element of 
their competitive advantage.  Given that leverage, it seems that establishing 
 
 6   Horace E. Anderson, Jr., The Privacy Gambit: Toward A Game Theoretic Approach 
to International Data Protection, 9 VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 11 (2006).  
 7   See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 369 (2016); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Orly Lobel, Law of the Platform, 101 MINN L. REV. 87 
(2016); Hal J. Singer, Paid Prioritization and Zero Rating: Why Antitrust Cannot Reach the 
Part of Net Neutrality Everyone is Concerned About, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, 1; 
Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, 2 AM. AFF. 3-16 (2018); K. 
Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New 
Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234 (2018). 
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an effective scheme to protect information privacy should be a priority. 
Further, this paper expands upon my earlier analysis of the applicability 
of a public trustee scheme or regulation and explores how a public trustee 
based regulatory regime might be designed in an era of big data and how it 
might be presented to gain political support.  The paper first briefly examines 
the three reasons that the FIPPs approach is no longer applicable or effective 
in today’s personal information environment.  Second, the paper reviews the 
current debate about regulating private power on the internet.  Third, it 
provides an explanation for why resolving privacy issues will also reduce 
fake news and misinformation problems without censorship of information 
and may also mitigate some of the issues associated with anti-competitive 
behavior.  Finally, this paper explores how and why a public trustee based 
regulatory regime is relevant in this area of controlling private power in a 
democracy and proposes institutional design features for an agency based on 
public trustee principles that might reduce the possibility for industry capture 
and over-politicization. 
II. INADEQUACY OF FIPPS APPROACH 
The traditional FIPPs approach to protecting privacy, similarly, 
enshrined in information privacy policies in virtually all countries with such 
policies—albeit with different schemes for enforcement—is primarily aimed 
at providing individuals with the means to protect their own privacy.  For 
many years, scholars, privacy advocates, and policymakers have questioned 
the effectiveness of this approach, especially when enforcement relies on 
individual initiative and is not supplemented with agency action.8  Survey 
research and precepts of behavioral economics support the finding that 
people do not read privacy notices informing individuals of organizational 
information practices.9  The problems and shortcomings of the FIPPs 
approach have been well documented, but recently are receiving renewed, 
and more serious, attention for three reasons. 
First, big data and algorithmic power have changed the nature and 
effects of personal information processing in ways that fundamentally 
 
 8   See generally PRISCILA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL 
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (UNC Press, 1995); Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, 
Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and 
Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199 (1993); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-
Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880–81 (2013); Jeff 
Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal 
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1999). 
 9   See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading 
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); Alessandro Acquisti, The 
Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 76 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).  
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challenge FIPPs-style regulation.  The advent of big data and use of 
algorithms coupled with machine learning have generated scores of social 
science and law review articles pointing out the various effects of these 
developments on information privacy generally, and on existing regulations 
protecting privacy.10  The techniques associated with big data enable new 
tools for generating data, designing data sets, culling the data for patterns 
and trends, and identifying either individual or group prototypes of behavior.  
Not only does big data entail collection and analysis of more and more 
refined data without individual knowledge, but big data also expands the 
power to influence, and restricts and predicts individuals’ actions and the 
opportunities presented to an individual.11  Privacy problems include 
controlling the collection and use of information about oneself, autonomy 
over decision-making, anonymity, choice in group associations, and 
discrimination or bias in decisions—raising not only classic FIPPs values of 
consent, choice, and transparency, but equally importantly related values of 
due process, equal protection, data security, and accountability. 
Second, the broad recognition of the social importance of privacy, 
especially its importance to democracy, renders the FIPPs approach even 
more problematic.  Since the mid-1990s, scholars across a number of 
disciplines have drawn attention to the reality that privacy is not just 
important to individuals but also critically important to society as a whole.12  
Recent developments over the last several years have underscored privacy’s 
importance as a public value and its critical importance to democratic 
 
 10   See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 153 (Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER, & HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT, 
xi (Cambridge U. Press, 2014); JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER, & HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT, 
xi (Cambridge U. Press, 2014); Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 339, 339–340 (2013); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: 
Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. 25, 25 (2013); Priscilla M. Regan, Big Data and Privacy, 
in ANALYTICS, POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 204 (Jennifer Bachner, Benjamin Ginsberg, & 
Kathryn Wagner Hill eds., 2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2016); Lisa M. Austin, Towards a Public Law of 
Privacy: Meeting the Big Data Challenge, 71 SUP. CT. L. REV. 540, 543 (2015). 
 11   Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data 
Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013). 
 12   See generally REGAN, supra note 8, at xiv; BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 
1 (R.D.V. Glasgow trans., 2005); Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in 
LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED 
SOCIETY 191–208 (Kerr et al. eds., 2009); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, ix 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2008); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, 
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 1 (Yale Univ. Press, 2012); HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL 
LIFE 3 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2010). 
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participation.  Across the globe, more sophisticated collection and analysis 
of personal information by candidates, political parties, and interest groups 
have fostered polarization and partisanship.13  Segmentation and the 
targeting of political messages to selected subgroups of the population 
undermine traditional notions of “the public” or a “body politic” which are 
fundamental to democratic citizenship.  If information privacy is important 
to maintaining the integrity of the public in a democratic system of 
government, then a policy approach based on individual choice and consent 
is not an appropriate policy remedy. 
Third, the emergence of large internet platforms controlling how 
individuals experience social, political, and economic life has rendered a 
FIPPs approach to protecting privacy obsolete and ineffective.  There is 
growing recognition that the complex socio-technical systems on which 
much of modern life is organized are now exhibiting attributes of public 
infrastructures.14  Alice Marwick and Danah Boyd see these technological 
shifts in the information and cultural landscapes creating “networked 
publics”15 and necessitating a conceptualization of privacy that moves 
beyond an individualistic approach.  Facebook, Google, and Amazon are the 
primary examples of the importance of socio-technical systems whose 
complex architectures and business models, scale and reach of their 
operations, and the huge number of people worldwide who use these systems 
underscore their infrastructural characteristics.  Under these circumstances, 
privacy has to be established as a component of the network or infrastructure, 
including the various databases and interconnections that compose the 
network, and privacy is shared collectively by those in the network.16 
III. ARGUMENTS FOR REGULATING PRIVATE POWER ON THE INTERNET 
There are three primary arguments being offered today to curb the 
private power wielded over internet-based activities.  These arguments are 
to some extent occurring on parallel tracks as they represent different, but 
arguably intersecting, concerns about aspects of the power of internet actors 
 
 13   Colin J. Bennett, Voter databases, Micro-targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can 
Political Parties Campaign in Europe as they do in North America, 6 INT’L DATA PRIV. L. 
261 (2016); Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861 
(2014); Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voting Public: Leveraging Personal 
Information to Construct Voter Preference, in BIG DATA, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING AND THE 
LAW (Normann Witzleb, et. Al ed., Routledge 2020) (2020).  
 14   DEBORAH G. JOHNSON & PRISCILLA M. REGAN, TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE 
AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A HOUSE OF MIRRORs (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
 15   Alice E. Marwick & Danah Boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate 
Context in Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA AND 1051, 1052 (2015). 
 16   REGAN, supra note 8, at 243; Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy and the Common Good: 
Revisited, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Beate 
Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015). 
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and activities.  The argument offered in this paper is that if policy effectively 
addresses the second concern, privacy intrusions, it will also address to some 
extent the first, anti-competitive behavior, and third, misinformation or “fake 
news,” concerns.  Imagine a Venn diagram of these three policy arguments 
or arenas.  Data about individuals is the intersection in the middle of the 
diagram. 
The first concern involves the real or potential anti-competitive 
behavior of key internet gatekeepers, especially internet service providers 
(herein “ISPs”), but also what are sometimes referred to as edge players/
platforms, including Google, Facebook, and Amazon.  These two sets of 
actors are currently regulated by different agencies: the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has jurisdiction over ISPs, but not over 
platforms, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over 
“unfair and deceptive trade practices” of platforms, but not ISPs.17  Much of 
the debate about anti-competitive behavior has focused on the policy 
solution of “net neutrality”—the idea that providers of internet content 
should not be discriminated against in their ability to provide offerings to 
consumers and that users should have equal access to see any legal content 
they choose.18  Evidence of horizontal and vertical consolidation of large 
online platforms and consolidation of ISPs has generated concern about 
possible blocking or discriminating amongst customers.  For example, 
among ISPs, Time Warner Cable merged with Charter Communications in 
2015, AT&T merged with Direct TV in 2015 and Time Warner in 2018, and 
Verizon merged with XO Communications in 2017.  Among internet 
platforms, Google has acquired YouTube, Doubleclick, ITA, Waxe, and 
AdMob, while Facebook has acquired Instagram and WhatsApp, among 
others, and Amazon has acquired Whole Foods and Zappos.  Net neutrality 
principles require ISPs to charge all content providers similarly and not to 
privilege large providers and customers to the detriment of smaller providers.  
In the U.S., debate over net neutrality has been contentious and partisan.  In 
2005, the FCC adopted  a form of net neutrality or non-discrimination 
guidelines; from 2006 to 2009, Congress unsuccessfully considered a 
number of net neutrality rules; and in 2010, a Circuit Court ruled that the 
FCC did not have the authority to regulate ISPs.19  In 2015, the FCC 
approved net neutrality rules, which were upheld by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as within the FCC’s jurisdiction, but then 
 
 17   Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Ilene Knable Gotts, Looking Ahead: The FTC’s Role in 
Information Technology Markets, 83 GEO WASH L. REV. (2015) 1876–1901. 
 18   Jan Kramer, Lukas Wiewiorra, and Christoff Weinhardt, Net Neutrality: A Progress 
Report, 37 TELECOMM. POL’Y REV. (2013): 794–813. 
 19   Jeffrey A. Hart, The Net Neutrality Debate in the United States, 8 J. OF INFO. TECH. & 
POL. 418–443 (2015). 
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repealed by the FCC in December 2017.  On April 10, 2019, the House on a 
party-line vote reinstated net neutrality rules, which are unlikely to be passed 
by the Senate.  California passed a net neutrality law in October 2018, which 
was challenged by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
The second concern addresses the commodification of personal 
information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions.  As discussed above, the 
policy solution of FIPPs is increasingly questioned and new approaches are 
being proposed.  For example, in May of 2018, the European Union 
instituted a more active regulatory stance in the General Data Protection 
Regulation (herein “GDPR”) which, among other things, requires all 
companies processing the personal data of data subjects residing in the 
Union, regardless of the company’s location to: request consent in an 
intelligible and easily accessible form, with the purpose for data processing 
duly noted; provide notifications of data breaches without undue delay; 
supply a free electronic copy of all personal data held by the controller; and 
entitle the data subject to have the data controller erase his/her personal data, 
cease further dissemination of the data, and potentially have third parties halt 
processing of the data.20  Additionally, Article 22 of the GDPR prohibits the 
use of automated/algorithmic decision-making that produces “legally 
significant” or “similar effects,” unless a human is involved in the process.21  
The institution of the GDPR, combined with continuing reports of large-
scale data breaches, increased attention to potential discriminatory effects of 
algorithms, and the introduction of new products that are reliant upon the use 
of personal information, have generated renewed policy discussions in the 
U.S. as well.  In 2018, California passed the California Consumer Privacy 
Act (herein “CCPA”) (effective January 2020) that mirrors many of the 
requirements of the GDPR and adopts a more regulatory approach than 
traditional FIPPSs.22  A number of congressional committees have held 
hearings, and several bills were introduced in 2018-2019, but all have stalled 
in committee.23 
The third concern involves the explosion of inaccurate or biased 
information particularly on social media and blog sites and its influence in 
shaping the democratic process, not just in one country, but globally, through 
 
 20   General Data Protection Directive, Intersoft Consulting, https://gdpr-info.eu/. (last 
visited 2020). 
 21   Id. 
 22   For discussion of the differences between the GDPR and CCPA, see Anupam 
Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, GEO. L. 
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER WORKS 2190 (2019). 
 23   See, e.g., Senator Wyden’s Consumer Data Protection Act; Senator Schatz’s Data 
Care Act; Senator Rubio’s American Data Dissemination Act; Senators Markey and 
Blumenthal’s CONSENT Act; and Senator Klobuchar’s Social Media and Privacy Protection 
and Consumer Rights Act.  See Chander, supra note 22, at pp. 34–35 for a more complete list. 
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the messages that are circulated to subsets of the population who are most 
likely to be interested in or influenced by those particular messages.  Concern 
about this issue intensified following the 2016 election in the U.S. as well as 
European elections and the rise of more radical right thinking around the 
world.  These discussions have focused on the knotty and unpopular question 
of censoring information—a policy that in the U.S. is abhorrent under the 
First Amendment but is equally concerning in European countries.  One 
critical issue, if any form of censorship is entertained, is who should be the 
appropriate party to make decisions about taking down internet content—the 
government, the company, or an objective third party? 
The key policy question seems to be not whether the powerful players 
on the internet should be regulated, but instead how best to regulate them.  
This sentiment was expressed by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg in answering 
a question posed by Senator Graham before the Senate Judiciary and Senate 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation committees when Zuckerberg 
replied “I think the real question, as the internet becomes more important in 
people’s lives is what’s the right regulation?”24  Part of the difficulty in 
answering this question has focused on determining what kind of entity these 
major internet players are—are they media companies, technology 
companies, financial companies, publishing companies or some new hybrid?  
How this question is answered will determine whether major internet players 
are bound by the rules and oversight of the FTC, FCC, the Federal Elections 
Commission (FEC), or some other regulatory agency.  Or perhaps a new 
entity designed to address the specific complications of their business 
models and activities is necessary altogether.  The next section presents the 
argument that if policymakers focus holistically on the problem of internet 
privacy and on the development of effective policy solutions for this 
problem, these solutions will also serve to minimize and curtail the problems 
of misinformation and “fake news” on the internet and will at least mitigate 
some of the issues associated with anti-competitive behavior by large 
internet actors. 
IV. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY 
It is widely recognized that the business models of large internet 
companies rely upon the collection, use, and analysis of personal 
information.  In exchange for “free” services—such as search engines, email, 
social networking connections, and navigation systems—individuals 
provide their personal information as they begin a relationship with the 
service and subsequently reveal their activities to the companies as they use 
 
 24   Aja Romano, Don’t Ask Whether Facebook Can Be Regulated. Ask Which Facebook 
to Regulate, VOX (2018), https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/4/12/17224096/regulating-
facebook-problems. 
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that service.  The data that companies acquire from their users enables them 
to refine the services they offer and to offer new or related services.  
Information about one person is also analyzed against the information of 
others who are similarly situated or whose activities or characteristics 
interact with that person. This enables internet companies to expand their 
insights into someone’s preferences or needs by virtue of information about 
others whom the person associates with or resembles in some way and thus 
to make more and/or more refined offerings to the person. 
The commodification of personal information and the information 
asymmetries of the personal information market that currently exists 
between individuals and internet companies are profound and obviate any 
ability for individuals to effectively exercise control over the use of their 
information.  The economics or market context in which personal privacy is 
seemingly negotiated inevitably draws attention to a number of what might 
be termed “market failures” including: asymmetries in knowledge about how 
personal information flows, lack of transparency regarding data exchanges, 
and lack of knowledge about the short-term and long-term implications and 
costs to the individual.25  In the era of “big data” and social networking sites, 
the personal information market is further complicated from a privacy 
protection perspective because the actions of other individuals, with whom 
one may or may not be associated, renders it impossible for individuals to 
procure reliable and complete information on the implications of revealing 
their information or engaging with a service that collects their information.  
On a number of online platforms, in particular social networking sites, one’s 
own information privacy is dependent upon one’s friends, friends of friends, 
professional colleagues, fellow members of political and interest groups, 
those who may have access to one’s information and, perhaps more 
critically, those whose actions may affect the privacy of others in that 
group.26  Moreover, these online platforms disclose information about your 
 
 25   Joshua A. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385 
(2015), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=dlj_online; A. 
Michael. Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from 
Environmental Impact Statements, U. ILL L. REV. 1713 (2015); Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, 
Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield 
and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67–93 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, Response to Privacy as a 
Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 51–65 (2016).  
 26   Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and 
Externalities, 6 ISJLP 425 (2011); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run 
Around Anonymity and Consent, in Julia Lane et. al., Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: 
Frameworks for Engagement, CAMBRIDGE UNI. PRESS (2014); Paul Ohm, Changing the 
Rules: General Principles for Data Use and Analysis, in Julia Lane et. al., Privacy, Big Data, 
and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement, CAMBRIDGE UNI. PRESS (2014); Regan, 
supra note 25. 
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activities within what they define as your social circle—based on algorithmic 
analyses and inferences about your preferences, social and political leanings, 
activities, use of time, etc.  Examples here abound.  Eventbrite, Evite, and 
other online invitation sites ask whether you want to see who else you know 
is coming or simply inform you who is coming—sharing with you 
information that these individuals likely did not know would be shared, as 
well as providing incentives for you to attend depending on who else was 
attending.  Likewise, Instagram suggests people who you should follow—
not at the initiative or desire of the person but based on Instagram’s analysis 
of who you follow and who they are following. 
Not only is personal information commodified, it is then analyzed by 
machine-based learning systems developed by data scientists to reveal even 
more information.  Use of this data and algorithmic tools for culling the data 
are not restricted to nudging you within your social circle but, as was starkly 
revealed with respect to Facebook’s activities in the 2016 American election, 
have also reached into areas fundamental to democracy.27  These activities 
involve sophisticated targeted messaging along the lines of behavioral 
advertising commonly practiced in the commercial sector,28 which 
companies argue are protected by the First Amendment.29  As the discussion 
of policy problems posed by targeted messaging of biased or false 
information to sway voters’ political views and votes ensues, the policy 
solution receiving the most attention focuses on some form of censorship or 
control over the content of messages.  This has engendered further 
disagreement about what type of entity would be most appropriate to exert 
such control: the companies themselves, e.g., Facebook; a government body; 
or some independent third party.  Not surprisingly, political views also color 
the debate and mask the pivotal role that personal information collection and 
use plays in causing both fake news/misinformation and the power wielded 
by major internet platforms. 
The collection and use of data about individuals also play a pivotal role 
in the competitive advantage of ISPs and large internet platforms.  Although 
ISPs appear not to have taken direct advantage of such information, the 
potential for it to engage in offering auxiliary services to individual 
customers or packaging such customers for online service providers does 
exist.  Large internet platforms, however, do clearly take advantage of what 
they know about their customers in shaping the users’ experience.  Such 
 
 27   See articles in Special Issue: Bennett, C. J. & Lyon, D. (2019). Data-driven elections: 
implications and challenges for democratic societies. Internet Policy Review, 8(4). 
DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1433  
 28   Burkell & Regan, supra note 13; Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voter 
Preferences, Voter Manipulation, Voter Analytics: Policy Options for Less Surveillance and 
More Autonomy, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 4 (2019).   
 29   Balkin, supra note 4.  
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control of the users’ experience involves an analysis of all that the user has 
done based on information about that user and inferences drawn based on 
that information.  As pointed out in Senator Warner’s draft white paper, 
“Pervasive tracking may give platforms important behavioral information on 
a consumer’s willingness to pay or on behavioral tendencies that can be 
exploited to drive engagement with an app or service.”30 
The 2006 observation of Clive Humby, U.K. mathematician and 
architect of Tesco’s Clubcard, that, “Data is the new oil . . . It’s valuable, but 
if unrefined it cannot really be used.  It . . .  must be broken down, analyzed 
for it to have value,” has been often-repeated.31  His reference here is to data 
about individuals and has fueled debates about what should be done to curtail 
the power of companies like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.  
The Economist wrote in 2017: 
Such dominance has prompted calls for the tech giants 
to be broken up, as Standard Oil was in the early 20th 
century. This newspaper has argued against such drastic 
action in the past. Size alone is not a crime. The giants’ 
success has benefited consumers. Few want to live without 
Google’s search engine, Amazon’s one-day delivery or 
Facebook’s newsfeed. Nor do these firms raise the alarm 
when standard antitrust tests are applied. Far from gouging 
consumers, many of their services are free (users pay, in 
effect, by handing over yet more data). Take account of 
offline rivals, and their market shares look less worrying. 
And the emergence of upstarts like Snapchat suggests that 
new entrants can still make waves . . . . But there is cause 
for concern. Internet companies’ control of data gives them 
enormous power. Old ways of thinking about competition, 
devised in the era of oil, look outdated in what has come to 
be called the “data economy.” A new approach is needed.32 
Implicit in the above is that the crux of the current problems associated 
with these firms is the data about individuals that they have amassed directly, 
indirectly, or by inference and that these firms can use to their competitive 
advantage in terms of both offering products and services to individuals and 
also undercutting business rivals.  Personal data gives these firms the central 
 
 30   Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and 
Technology Firms, White Paper 3, 
https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/07/30/warner_social_media_proposal.pdf.  
 31   See Michael Palmer, Data is the New Oil, 
https://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html. (last visited 2020). 
 32   The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, but Data, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-
resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. 
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asset that they control.  As Julie Cohen similarly notes, “the data extracted 
from individuals plays an increasingly important role as raw material in the 
political economy of informational capitalism.”33 
V. SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE POLICY REGIME 
Big data resources and applications have enhanced the power of 
personal data in ways that have further challenged information privacy, 
enhanced the competitive advantage of companies who control the data, and 
enabled the targeting of messages to select individuals and groups.  If big 
data resources and applications have become integral to modern life, then the 
organizations and transmission mechanisms that support big data take on the 
features of an infrastructure.34  Scholars and policymakers are analyzing 
these issues and offering a number of possible solutions, but often with a 
focus on one of the problems such as competitive advantage, information 
privacy, or targeted information.  Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth 
Cukier recognize a more active role for government regulation to control 
what they call the “data barons”—”[w]e must prevent the rise of the twenty-
first century robber barons who dominated America’s railroads, steel 
manufacturing, and telegraph networks.”35  Additionally, they advocate for 
the use of antitrust rules to curb abusive power and ensure conditions exist 
to promote a competitive market for big data, a solution that Elizabeth 
Warren as a 2020 Democratic presidential candidate has also called for 
Amazon, Facebook, and Google.36  Most recently, several state Attorney 
Generals have begun investigations into antitrust violations by Facebook and 
Google.37  In 2014, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (herein “PCAST”) suggested a policy solution similar to 
“trusted third party” options, which could establish and monitor privacy-
preference profiles and also review new data collection and use applications 
to determine how they fit within each of the profiles.38  Balkin proposed an 
“information fiduciaries” scheme that would require ISPs and major online 
 
 33   Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, supra note 7. 
 34   DEBORAH G. JOHNSON & PRISCILLA M. REGAN, POLICY OPTIONS FOR RECONFIGURING 
THE MIRRORS, IN TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: 
A HOUSE OF MIRRORS (2014). 
 35   Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 10, at 183. 
 36   Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking Up Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 
2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-break-up-amazon-
facebook.html.  
 37   Steve Lohr, New Google and Facebook Inquiries Show Big Tech Scrutiny is 
Bipartisan Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/technology/attorney-generals-tech-antitrust-
investigation.html.  
 38   President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Big Data and Privacy: 
A Technological Perspective, at 37 (May 2014). 
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platforms to abide by terms of trust and confidence protecting users and limit 
what organizations can do with user data.39  Daniel Greenwood, at the MIT 
Media Lab, and colleagues suggest the establishment of a “trust network” as 
a system of data sharing, “elegantly integrating computer and legal rules, 
allows automatic auditing of data use and allows individuals to change their 
permissions and withdraw data.”40 
In 2018, Senator Mark Warner issued a White Paper proposing a 
number of policy options including one to label certain services, such as 
Google, as “essential services,” a designation that would require internet 
platforms to provide access to these services on “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” terms (hereinafter “FRAND”) and prevent them from 
“engaging in self-dealing or preferential conduct.”41  Daniel Crane, an 
antitrust law professor, raises issues with enforcement of potential FRAND 
obligations: 
Another key issue with FRAND commitments or 
obligations—one not addressed in the white paper—is what 
institution has jurisdiction to determine when the dominant 
firm has failed to honor the FRAND obligation . . . . Courts 
are generally very bad at setting terms of dealing . . . . 
Regulatory agencies might take it up, but there is no agency 
with the obvious expertise or resources to decide what terms 
online platforms should have to offer third parties.42 
To this point, Hal Singer, an antitrust economist, suggests the 
establishment of a new independent “Net Tribunal”43 to police 
discriminatory conduct by dominant tech platforms—and potentially internet 
service providers.  Arguing that anti-trust law does not provide an effective 
solution, his proposal entails: 
[A]n alternative, ex post regime patterned loosely on 
the tribunal used to adjudicate discrimination complaints 
against cable video operators pursuant to Section 616 of the 
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
of 1992 (herein “Cable Act”). Although that tribunal 
operates under the Federal Communications Commission, 
the proposed tribunal here could be independent, as are 
 
 39   Balkin, supra note 4. 
 40   Daniel Greenwood et al., The New Deal on Data: A Framework for Institutional 
Controls, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 192, 
198 (Julie Lane et al. eds., 2014).  
 41   Warner, supra note 30, at 23. 
 42   Asher Schechter, Would Sen. Warner’s Ambitious Plan to Regulate Social Media 
Giants “Ruin” the Internet—Or Save it?, PROMARKET (August 13, 2018). 
 43   Singer, supra note 7. 
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Article I courts, operating free from reversals by political 
appointees at federal agencies.44 
Sabeel Rahman, at Brooklyn Law School, begins to develop a scheme 
to modify classic public utility regulatory tools to achieve accountability for 
internet platforms to meet standards of fair access and treatment, and 
protection of users.  However, he notes the challenging choices in terms of 
whether to provide for institutional oversight regulation by government, 
private actors or some hybrid or provide for structural regulation by 
addressing business models and market dynamics (2018).45 
Currently, there is no lack of suggested regulatory and legal suggestions 
to tackle this problem.  Not surprisingly, no single suggestion seems 
perfectly designed to combat the complexity of one of the current internet 
issues, much less to address all three.  As Singer notes, “the internet is not 
one thing—it is many things, and our current regulatory regimes are 
struggling to address that complexity.”46  There is no question that regulators 
are struggling and not doing very well in this struggle.  The 2015 net 
neutrality rules were repealed in December 2017, removing FCC jurisdiction 
over ISPs and reclassifying them as “information services” rather than 
“telecommunications services.”47  In effect, this returns jurisdiction over 
them to the FTC, which not only has its plate full, but also only has the power 
to act with ex post authority, the power to respond primarily to egregious 
cases or patterns of “deceptive and unfair trade practices,” and does not have 
the rulemaking power.  Congress is currently considering proposals to 
broaden FTC powers, but as exemplified by a recent hearing held in late 
September 2018, major internet companies—including AT&T, Apple, 
Amazon, Google, and Twitter—support increased staff and funding for the 
FTC but not enhanced legal authority.48 
In an interesting recent essay, Frank Pasquale, a law professor at the 
University of Maryland, portrays this modern debate as one between 
Jeffersonians, advocating use of antitrust laws, and Hamiltonians, 
advocating specific rules to curb abuses of corporate powers.  The author 
notes: 
It will be politically difficult to “unscramble the 
omelet” of currently dominant firms. Authorities are wary 
 
 44   Singer, supra note 7. 
 45   See generally K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet 
Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234–251 (2018). 
 46   Singer, supra note 7. 
 47   Restoring Internet Freedom, FED. COMM. COMM’N, FCC 17-166 (adopted Dec. 14, 
2017). 
 48   Examining Safeguards for Consumer Data Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Com., Sci., and Tech., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Sen. John Thune, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Com., Sci., and Tech.).  
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of reversing mergers and acquisitions, even when they are 
obviously problematic in hindsight. While Jeffersonians 
may keep our digital giants from getting bigger, 
Hamiltonians will need to monitor the current practices of 
these firms and intervene when they transgress social 
norms.49 
Given the partisanship in Washington, the reluctance of internet firms to 
succumb to regulation, and the prevailing sense that there should not be a 
rush to regulate but instead a need to get it “right,” it is likely that debates 
about what actions to take will drag on for some time.  Meanwhile, current 
practices will continue to be unchecked, intensifying concerns about privacy, 
competition, and misinformation.  Yet again, hindsight will likely reveal that 
something should have been done sooner. 
The hindsight revelation may be reminiscent of the proposal for a 
Federal Privacy Board that was included in the original version of the 
Privacy Act of 1974 proposed by Senator Ervin.  The question of an 
independent privacy agency was a point of contention even before the 
congressional hearings.  Both the Westin/Baker study50 (1972) and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) advisory committee51 
(1973) recommended against the establishment of a commission—and in 
congressional hearings all federal agencies and many private sector 
organizations voiced opposition as well.  Although the Senate bill provided 
for the establishment of a Privacy Protection Commission, the House bill did 
not.  The final bill established a Privacy Protection Study Commission 
(herein “PPSC”), which concluded in its 1977 report that existing federal 
agencies with regulatory authority over certain areas, such as the FTC would 
be appropriate control mechanisms.52  As information practices have become 
more sophisticated and as other countries have established such agencies, 
proposals to establish a privacy commission of some type in the U.S. are 
raised—but have never garnered significant support or serious consideration. 
However, the time might be right for serious consideration of a well-
designed privacy board or commission that is premised on the concept that 
internet actors have a duty to act as “public trustees” in their processing of 
personal data.  This might provide an appropriate solution for a number of 
reasons.  First, the focus is on information practices which, as argued above, 
 
 49   Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, 2 AMERICAN AFFAIRS 
14 (2018). 
 50   ALAN F. WESTIN AND MICHAEL BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, 
RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY (1972). 
 51   U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).  
 52   PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION 
SOCIETY (1977).  
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address privacy concerns, anti-competitive potential, and misinformation 
spread.  Second, it embraces time-honored principles of “public interest, 
convenience and necessity” from early communications regulation under the 
FCC and recognition of “essential services” operating under “fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms from antitrust regulation.  Third, 
it acknowledges the fundamental connection between privacy and trust 
necessary in the information economy,53  and would move privacy principles 
“from procedural means of compliance for data extraction towards 
substantive principles to build trusted, sustainable information 
relationships.”54  With an emphasis on data holders as public trustees, policy 
discussions would shift from focusing on the negative effects of information 
collection and use to determining what kinds of information practices serve 
a public interest in an information economy.55  Fourth, it need not, and should 
not, entail a static, one-size fits all, innovation-stifling approach, but permits 
flexibility and learning instead—especially in areas such as the use of 
algorithms. 
The design of such an agency is without question a challenge—
especially in today’s anti-regulatory environment with high levels of distrust 
in government.  The data protection agencies of Europe and the privacy 
commission in Canada may provide templates that can be borrowed from 
and modified, especially based on their experiences with what has been 
effective and what has not.56  However, the policy problem the agency seeks 
to address is not privacy per se, but on controlling the private power of 
internet actors, a power largely premised on their collection and analysis of 
personal data, which has spawned three inter-related problems: privacy, 
anticompetitive behavior, and misinformation. 
Before tackling the question of how such an agency might be designed, 
let me first note that my focus is on the agency, not the standards or rules 
that the agency would be charged to implement.  As noted above, there are 
numerous congressional bills and congressional testimonies discussing what 
rules, principles, or standards should be included in legislation.  However, 
although as Cameron Kerry points out, there is much agreement on the key 
principles, nonetheless, “it is a challenge to articulate these in ways that are 
concrete without being too prescriptive or too narrow.”57  Although the 
 
 53   Regan, supra note 10; Richards & Woodward, supra note 3; Hirsch, supra note 25. 
 54   Richards & Woodward, supra note 3. 
 55   Regan, supra note 10.  
 56   See Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy 
Instruments in Global Perspective, Hampshire: Ashgate (2003); and, DAVID H. FLAHERTY, 
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 
SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES (1989). 
 57   Cameron F. Kerry, Will this new Congress be the one to pass data privacy 
legislation?, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Jan. 7, 2019), 
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question of standards or principles is not my focus, as noted above, the 
shortcomings of the FIPPs approach requires a shift in policy thinking to 
obligate organizations to responsibly handle personal information.  In setting 
such obligations or duties, it is first important to point out that the target of 
inquiry here is large organizational entities, or the “data barons” if you will, 
and not small, local organizations that have information on a limited number 
of customers or members with whom they have a direct and somewhat 
limited relationship.58  Additionally, in setting obligations and duties, Margot 
Kaminski’s conclusion that “both the current penalties and the current levels 
and kinds of uncertainty in the U.S. privacy regime are not enough to drive 
industry to the table in efficiency-maximizing ways” is important to 
consider.59  She argues that effective policy will require broad standards 
backed by enforcement; ensuring that there is uncertainty over what the 
standards require and therefore driving companies to negotiate with the 
enforcement agency.60  The discussion below regarding the design of a new 
agency assumes that Congress does pass legislation setting out broad, rather 
than specific, principles that would serve as a baseline for agency 
deliberations. 
Second, this article takes the position that a new agency is needed to 
take the lead in these areas although it should, as will be discussed below, 
work with, not against, the existing agencies.  At this point, a number of 
federal agencies exercise some jurisdiction over personal information 
practices in different sectors, such as the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) over health information and Department of Education over 
student information.  Generally, the FTC is recognized as the leading agency 
on privacy, but its powers in the privacy and security realm are not as 
extensive (for example, rulemaking power) as needed.  In a fairly exhaustive 
analysis of FTC privacy actions, Daniel Solove and Woodward Hartzog 
found that FTC actions demonstrate “quite thick” jurisprudence, which has 
features of a “robust regulatory privacy regime.”61  As they also note, 
however, not all companies are required to or do have privacy policies 




 58   California’s CCPA excludes companies with less than $25 million in annual gross 
income and Senator Wyden’s proposed Consumer Data Privacy Act does not cover businesses 
below a certain size—less than $50 million in average annual receipts and not collecting 
information on over 1 million people and devices.  See Chander, supra note 22, fn.189. 
 59   Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the 
NTIA, 94 DEN. L. REV. 925, 946 (2016). 
 60   Id. 
 61   Daniel Solove and Woodward Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583–86 (2014). 
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which do not always generate an open record.62  They conclude their analysis 
by saying that, “the FTC has not fully exerted its powers or pushed the 
logical ex-tensions of its theories” and could expand its powers beyond 
privacy policies.63  In a subsequent article, they similarly point to the 
nimbleness of the FTC, its tradition of working well with other agencies with 
overlapping mandates, and its ability to be flexible in determining harms, but 
fault it for being “quite conservative” and “more of a norm-codifier than 
norm-maker”64 and ask it to be “bolder and more aggressive[.]”65 
Moreover, a new agency would not only be better positioned to counter 
the weaknesses of the FTC but would also better address the range of 
concerns about information flows that lead not only to privacy and security 
issues, but also unfair competition and disinformation on the internet.  
Additionally, its orientation would be broader than legal, allowing it to be 
nimbler than the FTC. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the FTC was 
founded in 1914 and designed for the problems of an earlier age—its 
mission, organizational culture, and statute have adapted somewhat to the 
challenges of the information age.66  But at the same time, there is arguably 
a historical drag, a tendency towards following standard operating 
procedures, and a legalistic culture that constrains its ability to approach the 
complexity of the problems of the information age with a fresh perspective. 
VI. DESIGNING A TRUST AGENCY 
There are several inter-related features that are likely to be critical both 
to support for an agency charged with regulating internet actors so that they 
act as trustees of the public interest and to the success of an agency in 
achieving this goal.  The first two involve the name and position of the 
agency in the federal structure, and the following five directly address 
designing the agency to avoid capture by regulated industries and over-
politicization by partisan interests. 
The first is the name of the agency.  The policy goal to which the agency 
is to be committed is to require large internet actors to act as public trustees, 
and the name of the agency should reflect that—possibly the “Data Trustee 
Board” or the “Data Trust and Integrity Board.”  In this sense, it should be 
framed more like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (herein 
“NIST”), which ensures the technical integrity of the internet, but with a 
 
 62   Id. 
 63   Id. at 666.  
 64   Woodward Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2266 (2015). 
 65   Id. at 2234. 
 66   See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FED. TRADE COMM’N PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY (Cambridge University Press, 2016) (2016). 
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focus on the internet’s data integrity.  Privacy is one—albeit, critically 
important—aspect of data integrity, but experience has demonstrated that 
privacy has not provided a compelling narrative that the public truly 
embraces, as it can be undermined by simplified notions of  “having nothing 
to hide,” and privacy is a multi-faceted concept that encompasses several 
important interests that may be under-appreciated by grouping them under 
privacy.  The agency title should both better convey the policy goal being 
protected and should take advantage of the opportunity to reframe the policy 
issue. 
The second is the placement of the agency in the federal organizational 
structure.  At this point, there are a number of agencies that share jurisdiction 
over pieces of the three issues involving personal information flows that are 
examined in this paper—privacy intrusions, anti-competitive behavior, and 
misinformation or “fake news.”  Given the range of issues, the technical 
sophistication of information practices, and the desire to move beyond a 
legalistic framework, one option might be to house the new agency as a 
separate agency in the Department of Commerce, along with NIST and 
NTIA. 
Given the past success of large internet actors to lobby successfully 
against any form of government regulation and the expertise that internet 
actors have over the dynamics of the flows of personal information, the 
primary design challenge in establishing this agency is to provide it with the 
institutional capacity to avoid being captured by the industries it is to 
regulate and to insulate it from becoming politicized while also empowering 
it to collaborate with those industries.  This is no small task, but much has 
been written in both administrative law and political science about regulatory 
capture that offers some guidance in this area; however, the dynamics of 
capture will be contextual varying in the structure of the interest group 
environment and the partisan positions on regulation.  Put most simply, 
“capture describes situations where organized interest groups successfully 
act to vindicate their goals through government policy at the expense of the 
public interest.”67  Scott Hempling points out that regulatory capture is 
neither corruption nor control but is essentially an attitude on the part of the 
regulated entities where the regulators are biased or constantly persuaded by 
the identity or position of the regulated rather than the merits of any 
arguments about the need or contours of regulation, which becomes 
“reflected in a surplus of passivity and reactivity, and a deficit of curiosity 
 
 67   Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and 
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013); Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal 
Agency Bias and Regulatory Review 38 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-47, 2013). 
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and creativity.”68  He goes on to argue that, 
[A]n agency is susceptible to capture when there are: 
(a) policy voids instead of vision; (b) priorities and 
procedures that reflect parties’ requests rather than public 
interest needs; (c) chronic resource differentials between the 
regulator and regulated; and (d) fair-weather politicians 
whose support for regulation sags when pressured by those 
who would weaken it.69 
David Freeman Engstrom differentiates two types of capture, both of which 
are likely to bedevil regulation of internet actors.  The first, materialist, or 
classic, captures that which involves asymmetric stakes among groups, 
collective action problems, and structural problems.  Second, a newer, non-
materialist, view of capture entailing dominance of ideas that “what is good 
for Wall Street is good for America.”70 
Given the largely self-regulatory stance that the government has taken 
to this point regarding internet actors and the scale and complexity of their 
business models, the mandate of an independent agency in this area should 
not be to oversee that organizations are abiding by detailed rules and to mete 
out punishment.  Instead, its mandate should be to work somewhat more 
collaboratively with internet actors to understand the goals of personal data 
practices, to identify consequences (intended and unintended) of those 
practices, and to evaluate whether the practices are consistent with the 
“public interest, convenience and necessity.”  Its mandate should not be to 
stifle innovation, but to ensure socially responsible innovation.  Lessons and 
insights from co-regulation attempts in the U.S. and Europe offer some 
guidance as to what to avoid and what to add71 so that an agency will need 
to have sufficient authority and stature to require an internet actor to modify 
or cease a data practice that is not in the public interest. 
So, how might an agency be designed to avoid being captured or 
politicized while at the same time being able to maintain a collaborative 
relationship with the regulated industries and the trust of the public?  These 
goals are somewhat overlapping in that features of institutional structures 
and capacities can address more than one goal.  The key design challenges 
 
 68   Scott Hempling, Regulatory Capture, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
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 69   Id. at 33. 
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include decisions about: (1) whether the agency should have a single or 
multi-member head, the length of terms of service, and the conditions under 
which the head(s) of agencies can be removed; (2) what is the funding source 
for the agency; (3) how can the agency marshal the expertise that it needs to 
regulate; (4) what are the relationships of the agency with other federal 
agencies, as well as state actors and public advocates; (5) how transparent is 
the decision-making of the agency; and (6) what is the ability of the agency 
to generate the information it needs to regulate effectively? 
A. Agency Leadership 
There are advantages as well as disadvantages to both single member 
and multi-member agency leadership.72  Single member heads, particularly 
with longer terms of service (five to seven years, for example) provide a clear 
point of authority, enabling the agency to act quickly and decisively, and 
some insulation from the politics of the day, as well as providing a single 
point of accountability to the public.  At the same time, single member heads 
arguably have too much independent authority.  Multi-member heads with 
overlapping terms of service generally entail different perspectives and 
involve a certain amount of bargaining, negotiating, and compromise to 
reach decisions, thus providing a type of internal check and balance.  The 
Consumer Financial Protection Board (herein “CFPB”) and the Federal 
Housing Financial Agency (herein “FHFA”), both of which were established 
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, are single-member heads with five 
year terms with Presidential removal only for cause (e.g., inefficiency, 
neglect of duty, or malfeasance).  However, the constitutionality of single 
member heads for both the CFPB and FHFA has been challenged on the 
basis that it entails too much independence from political control, especially 
when combined with a source of funding independent of the appropriations 
process.73  Given this constitutional uncertainty, it is likely wise to establish 
a multi-member leadership structure with overlapping five-year terms and 
removal only for well-defined cause, with some combination of 
congressional and presidential appointment. 
B. Funding Source 
Given the vast financial resources of major internet actors and the lack 
of detailed information about their business models, an independent source 
 
 72   See generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies 
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 73   Sarah Harrington, Kavanaugh on the Executive Branch: PHH Corp. v. Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, SCOTUS BLOG (August 8, 2018, 10:25 AM), 
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of funding for this new agency seems to be a critical factor in ensuring that 
the agency would avoid both capture and politicization.  There are two ways 
to ensure some financial independence for an agency.  The first is to enable 
agencies to submit their budget proposals directly to Congress bypassing 
OMB; this eliminates the executive’s ability to change the agency’s request, 
but still leaves it open to congressional wrangling.  The second, and more 
effective alternative, is to provide agencies with an independent source of 
funding, such as by requiring the regulated entities to pay mandatory fees to 
the agency.  As Rachel Barkow points out, the Federal Reserve’s funding is 
through assessments on member banks, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and CFPB are similarly 
funded; this insulates the agencies from both congressional and presidential 
influence.74  Charles Kruly similarly points that “when Congress combines 
self-funding with other traditional indicia of agency independence—
typically, structural features that insulate an agency from executive 
control—Congress creates what are likely the most structurally independent 
agencies in the federal government;”75 however, he goes on to note the 
importance of other structural features in ensuring this independence. 
C. Expertise 
Providing the agency with a level of expertise so that it can evaluate 
what the industries say is also critical to maintaining independence and 
avoiding capture and politicization.  This can be achieved both at the 
leadership level and at the staff level.  In this case, the leadership and staff 
of the agency should also be interdisciplinary and include, for example, 
technologists, data scientists, ethicists, and social scientists, with lawyers 
kept to a minimum.  Presidential or congressional appointees can be required 
to have certain qualifications, which then somewhat mitigates partisan 
influence.  This is not an unusual requirement for agencies where scientific 
or technical expertise is important—for example, by statute, the leadership 
of the Food and Drug Administration requires scientific expertise, the 
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board requires “respected experts in the 
field of nuclear safety,” the Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety 
Board cannot hold the office of Commissioner if he or she is “in the employ 
of, or holding any official relation to, any person engaged in selling or 
manufacturing consumer products” or owns “stock or bonds of substantial 
value in a person so engaged” or “is in any other manner pecuniarily 
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interested in such a person.”76  Similar requirements can be established for 
staff.  Initially, it may also be wise to detail staff from other federal agencies 
with jurisdiction in this area, such as the FTC, FCC and NTIA, which would 
transfer not only a degree of expertise but also some measure of institutional 
memory to the new agency. 
D. Relationships with Federal, State, and Public Actors 
This brings us to the question of the relationships of the new agency 
with other federal agencies, as well as state actors and public advocates.  The 
issues of online privacy, net neutrality, and online speech have spawned a 
cottage industry of potential and actual regulators, as well as a range of 
industry and public interest groups.  This is already a crowded field, with the 
FTC, FCC, and NTIA, as well as Department of Education and HHS, already 
having some jurisdiction, but as the earlier analysis indicates the field is not 
one where there is clear leadership and one where there is need for more 
coordination and authority to act.  Rather than resist the existing 
governmental actors in this area, a new agency could utilize their support, 
working collaboratively with these agencies.  But, as Rachel Barkow argues, 
the new agency would need to be defined as having primary responsibility: 
It is all too easy for agencies to point fingers at each 
other with no one ultimately held accountable. Indeed, that 
scenario is eerily similar to the lead-up to the recent 
financial crisis, with each over-lapping regulatory agency 
essentially casting blame on others. To remedy this risk and 
achieve a check on capture, the insulated agency should be 
designated as the primary enforcer to ensure greater 
accountability and to increase the incentives for the 
responsible agency to take action.77 
Designating the new agency as primary is likely to generate opposition from 
the large internet actors, who at this point are quite comfortable with having 
the FTC as the primary agency in this area and are supportive of more staff 
for the FTC, but not more enforcement power.  However, indicating the new 
agency as the primary agency is critical to its effectiveness.  The new 
agency’s relationships with state actors are likely to be easier to navigate.  
As Barkow points out in guidance on how to design institutions to avoid 
capture, allowing state Attorneys General (AG) to also bring enforcement 
actions can be an effective check against capture and protects against 
underenforcement of regulations.  AG involvement provides an additional 
level of protection against the possibility that federal agencies bow to the 
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 77   Barkow, supra note 74, at 56. 
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President’s priorities, which may be dictated by powerful interest groups.78  
Professor Danielle Citron has carefully documented the activities of AGs in 
privacy and security issues and concludes that they have responded quickly 
to consumer privacy concerns in part because they are less constrained by 
“bureaucratic wrangling.”79  Citron also notes that AGs have institutionalized 
collaboration about best practices and emerging risks in the monthly 
telephone calls of the NAAG Privacy Working Group.80  A new agency 
would also be able to work with this Group on a regular basis. 
Institutionalizing collaboration with public advocates is another design 
feature to avoid capture and over-politicization.  There are a range of public 
interest groups, including most prominently the ACLU, CDT, EPIC, and 
EFF, that are concerned with privacy and security, anti-competitive behavior 
of internet actors, net neutrality, and disinformation on the internet.  There 
are a number of ways that these groups might be formally, as well as 
informally, involved in a new agency’s activities.  Examples might include 
membership on an advisory committee that meets regularly or a formal 
position of public advocate to represent “the public’s interest before the 
agency.”81  Additionally, the new agency might institutionalize a similar type 
of involvement for privacy professionals “on the ground” and for the 
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).82  The richness 
and robustness of the interest groups in this area should be an asset for the 
new agency.  Further, institutionalizing collaboration with these groups is an 
important buffer against industry capture and over-politicization. 
E. Transparency and Information Generation 
Given that the mandate of the new agency is to act as a public trustee, 
maintaining the transparency of the agency’s work is a priority and is also a 
protection against capture and politicization.  As Barkow argues: 
[O]ne of the most powerful weapons policy makers can 
give agencies is the ability to generate and disseminate 
information that is politically powerful . . . . The key is to 
give the agency the authority to study and publicize data that 
will be of interest to the public and help energize the public 
to overcome collective action problems and rally behind the 
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 81   See Barkow, supra note 74, at 62. 
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agency.83 
Policy and decision processes of the agency should be open to the public 
utilizing traditional Administrative Procedure Act (APA) practices regarding 
notice and comment periods for proposed regulations.  As Engstrom points 
out, the transparency and pluralistic participation required by rulemaking is 
more insulated from regulated interest group influence and bolsters 
congressional oversight by providing “fire alarms,”84 using a distinction 
developed by McCubbins and Schwartz.85  Consistent with this, proposed 
regulations should not be subject to review by OMB’s Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) providing protection against both capture 
and politicization.  Likewise, decisions regarding industry practices that 
allegedly violate information practice regulations should be made publicly 
available. 
Two additional design features can enhance traditional agency 
transparency requirements.  The first, as Barkow suggests, is the 
establishment of a research arm within agencies—an idea that is very 
suitable in this instance, especially in the area of big data and algorithms.86  
This is consistent with Orley Lobel’s argument that, in dealing with 
regulation of platforms, “regulatory agencies should view themselves not 
merely as reactive enforcers, but also as active researchers of these 
changes.”87  Another design feature is the utilization of third-party auditors, 
which also would provide a means of gaining information about how internet 
actors are using algorithms.  As Lesley McAllister explains, “private third-
party verifiers essentially act in the place of governmental agents to conduct 
inspections and make regulatory compliance determinations.  Governmental 
agencies, in turn, take on new roles in coordinating and overseeing these 
private actors.  As a form of public-private governance, third-party 
verification may further the goals of social regulation.”88  Although this may 
reduce the direct costs to a government agency, it establishes a longer chain 
of accountability and requires careful oversight both of the third-party 
verifiers and the industry.  It has the advantage, however, of providing a 
means to extract relevant information. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica debacle, somewhat 
bizarre censoring actions on the part of social media companies leading up 
to the mid-term elections, heightened public concern about algorithmic 
decision-making, and increased concentration among major internet actors.  
There may actually be a window to engage the complexity of controlling the 
private power of major internet actors rather than endorse incremental policy 
changes that are destined to be ineffective.  Until now, as Julie Cohen aptly 
puts it, “Law for the platform economy is already being written—not via 
discrete, purposive changes, but rather via the ordinary, uncoordinated but 
self-interested efforts of information-economy participants and the lawyers 
and lobbyists they employ.”89  Much of the congressional debate, as well as 
the public debate, has coalesced around proposals to strengthen the role of 
the FTC and to provide more effective “notice and choice” to consumers—
both of which fail to understand the larger economic changes that have taken 
place in the platform-based economy and the dominance of large internet 
actors. 
In this paper, I have advanced two related arguments.  The first is that 
the current unchecked flows of personal information have not only caused 
privacy and security problems but have also played pivotal roles in causing 
fake news and misinformation and increasing the power of major internet 
platforms.  If policy addresses this underlying cause effectively, then such 
policy would not only address information privacy issues, but also 
ameliorate or mitigate the issues associated with anti-competitive behavior 
by ISPs and internet platforms, and with misinformation and fake news.  My 
second argument is that the effectiveness of policy in this area hinges on the 
establishment of a new agency designed to avoid capture by the regulated 
industries and over-politicization by partisan interests. 
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